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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
Research and Analysis Branch

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JAPANESE WAR PRODUCTION INDUSTRIES

Part IV

The Shipbuilding Industry

Description

Discussion of the Japanese shipbuilding industry; corporate structure and the history of governmental control receive the major emphasis. The capacity and technological aspects of this industry are also discussed.

31 October 1945

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By the middle of 1944, Japan's losses of merchant and naval vessels had so reduced the number of oceangoing ships that she was unable to find the transport required both to supply military forces committed in various areas and to move the volume of raw materials necessary to maintain 1943 levels of industrial output. In order to make ship construction equal losses, Japan would have had to build merchant vessels at the rate of at least 2,500,000 gross tons in 1944.

Latest figures as revealed by the Japanese Diet (5 September 1945) indicate that the nation had no more than 200,000 odd gross tons of operable

merchant tonnage (over 100 tons) left at the cessation of hostilities.<sup>1/</sup>  
Diet figures for wartime naval building and losses are given in Table 10.

\* \* \* \* \*

B. Organization of the Shipbuilding Industry

1. Brief History and Economic Considerations.

a. Review to 1932. In addition to considering the specific questions of security and convertibility in the Japanese shipbuilding industry, it is necessary that we review historically and briefly the economic aspects of the shipbuilding industry in Japan with a view to determining to what extent the industry has been expanded along uneconomic lines.

Ever since the Restoration of 1868, the Japanese Government has paid close attention to shipping problems, and soon after the war of 1895 in China, it embarked on a program of subsidies governed by laws enacted in 1896. The abnormal boom conditions prevailing during World War I, when (in 1919) 612,000 gross tons of merchant ships were launched, diminished the need for subsidies, but soon afterwards the annual amount of operating subsidies tended to revert to dimensions of 1914.

During the 1920's the shipbuilding industry entered a long period of depression. Merchant ship construction dropped to a low of 42,000 gross tons in 1927, and operating subsidies amounted to about ten million yen a year. During this period, the Government did not give direct shipbuilding subsidies, but assisted shipbuilders by means of bounties on domestic steel production and certain exemptions from import duties. In 1929 the Government framed a program for the assistance of shipping in the form of loans on easy terms for shipbuilding. A loan fund of thirty million yen was made available,

<sup>1/</sup> This figure may be a little on the low side to gain Allied sympathy and aid for their economic reconstruction. For example, their total does not include tonnage of ships in repair which exceeds operable tonnage.

but owing to the world economic depression which followed, little use was made of this facility. A slow increase then began; the rate of increase was greatly accelerated in the early 30's by a government subsidized program of merchant ship construction. Under government direction Japanese lines acquired fast cargo ships which were the equal of any in their class in the world.

b. Scrap and Build Schemes; Shipbuilding During the 1930's. In 1932, the Japanese Government made an important decision when, with a view to improving the unfavorable age distribution of the Japanese Merchant Marine and to reducing the frequency of marine casualties, it introduced the first of three "Scrap and Build" Schemes. The first scheme, which took effect as of 1 October 1932, provided for the construction of 200,000 gross tons of new shipping, on condition that two tons of vessels of twenty-five years and over were scrapped for each ton of new vessels built under subsidy. Each new vessel had to be 4,000 gross tons or over, capable of at least thirteen and one-half knots speed, and built in a Japanese yard.

The scheme resulted in the scrapping of ninety-four vessels of about 400,000 gross tons and in the building of thirty-one new vessels of about 200,000 gross tons.

It was estimated that the expenditure involved in building the thirty one ships was a little less than 55,000,000 yen. The total government subsidy was nearly 11,000,000 yen.

The second and third schemes, which took effect in 1935 and 1936 respectively, were on a smaller scale than the first. Their combined result was the scrapping of 100,000 gross tons and the construction of seventeen vessels of about 100,000 gross tons, the rate of subsidy being little more than half that under the first scheme. The vessels built had a gross tonnage of 4,000 tons or more and were capable of over fifteen knots speed.

By the early part of 1937, the three Scrap and Build Schemes had resulted in the scrapping of some 500,000 gross tons of old tonnage and the construction of forty-eight new fast ships of some 300,000 tons gross. These forty-eight included more than four-fifths of the total number of Japanese vessels of over 4,000 gross tons and less than five years old. At that time Japan had more tonnage less than five years old in proportion to her total tonnage than any other country. The following table shows the ships constructed and scrapped in accordance with the three ship improvement plans.

Table 17

Ships Constructed and Scrapped in Accordance with the Three Ship Improvement Plans

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Ships Constructed</u>		<u>Ships Dismantled</u>		<u>Fiscal Year</u>
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>	
First	31	198,989	94	399,122	1931-34
Second	8	49,760	12	52,798	1935-36
Third	9	50,690	13	47,235	1936-37
Total	48	299,439	119	499,155	

Note: It was not possible to ascertain the number of vessels actually dismantled under the third plan.

The cost of the three ship improvement plans totalled ¥ 14,000,000 (¥4,062,800), including ¥ 11,000,000 for the first plan and ¥ 1,500,000 for each of the next two plans.

A fourth scheme came into operation in April 1937 and provided for the subsidized construction of superior passenger and passenger-cargo liners of not less than 6,000 gross tons and nineteen knots speed, at rates of subsidy approximating in some cases half the building cost. In a supplement to the Official Gazette of July 1937, it was stated that the subsidies, though payable by installments spread over eighteen years, would be paid during the next four years for the construction of 150,000 gross tons of passenger vessels and 150,000 gross tons of passenger-cargo vessels. It was proposed to spend a total of over fifty million yen on this scheme during the eighteen years beginning with 1937-38.

\* \* \* \* \*

Table 18 gives the total launchings of vessels of 100 gross tons and upwards for selected years between 1913 and 1938:

Table 18

Total Launchings of Merchant Vessels (in tons)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1913	152	64,664
1920	140	456,642
1930	37	151,272
1932	44	54,422
1934	155	152,420
1936	180	294,861
1937	180	451,121
1938	146	441,720

Source: Shipbuilding in Japan, 1940 (Japan Economic Federation).

The trend in the middle thirties was towards the construction of luxury passenger liners for deep-sea service, but was reversed after the outbreak of the war with China. The shipbuilding industry directly reflected the change in shipping needs from large-sized vessels for deep-sea service to small and medium-sized bottoms for coastal trade. Of the total orders placed up to the end of May 1939, 165 cargo vessels accounted for 808,670 tons. Of these, thirty-four vessels larger than the 7,000-ton class amounted to 306,600 tons, while 133 under 6,000 tons totalled 502,070 tons. Compared with the figures for 30 November 1938 or six months earlier, the former class showed a decline of two in number and 27,930 in tonnage, but the latter class gained eighty-five in number and 325,420 in tonnage.

Table 19 shows the ships launched by 1,000 ton classes between 1932 and 1938. Little change in emphasis is visible here.

Table 19

Class	No. of Ships	1932 tons	%	No. of Ships	1934 tons	%	No. of Ships	1936 tons	%	No. of Ships	1937 tons	%	No. of Ships	1938 tons	%
1,000	1	1,500)		1	1,400)		18	25,820)		24	36,355)		15	29,229)	
2,000	4	9,900)	60	2	5,200)	30	7	19,050)	31	13	35,000)	24	11	30,850)	41
3,000	1	3,500)		1	3,000)		9	31,510)		8	23,030)		7	24,100)	
4,000	-	---		2	9,000)		9	38,930)		14	62,700)		10	44,250)	
5,000	-	---	20	-	---	25	4	21,500)	36	6	32,380)	36	3	15,950)	37
6,000	2	12,000)		3	20,100)		6	39,200)		9	58,580)		16	104,750)	
7,000	-	---		9	66,250)		3	22,150)		13	93,420)		5	35,500)	
8,000	2	16,800)		-	---	55	2	17,550)	20	1	8,900)	27	1	9,800)	9
9,000	-	---		2	19,730)		2	18,220)		1	9,000)		1	9,800)	
10,000	-	---		-	---		3	36,800)	13	4	55,100)	13	9	110,200)	13
Total	10	43,760		20	124,180		63	270,710		93	419,665		77	414,090	

Source: Far East Yearbook, 1941.

c. Naval Construction; Comparison with Merchant Vessel Construction.

Naval vessel construction was of course also stressed during this period, as is shown by the following table (Table 20). Merchant ship launchings are also shown in this table and it will be noted that minor variations exist between these figures and those previously given in Table 19. These differences are not significant, but largely reflect different source material. The information below is carried over into 1940.

Table 20

Total Tonnage of Steel Merchant Ships and Naval Vessels Launched  
by Yards in Japan and Japanese-Controlled Territory

	1934-1940	
	Naval Ships (displ. tons)	Merchant Ships (gross tons)
1940	157,510	208,014
1939	118,790	342,880
1938	53,812	438,890
1937	52,258	487,357
1936	53,305	305,803
1935	39,762	145,901 <sup>a/</sup>
1934	38,274	154,860 <sup>a/</sup>

Source: Glasgow Herald, Annual Trade Review, 1936, 1937, 1938.  
 Lloyd's Register of Shipping. London, Special tabulation  
 supplied in March, 1943. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1941.  
 Oriental Economist (Tokyo) April, 1936.

<sup>a/</sup> Includes only the output in Japan proper.



## 2. Government Encouragement and Supervision; Laws.

a. Shipbuilding Industry Law.<sup>1/</sup> The China and European Wars necessitated a large increase in the military shipping of Japan. It was necessary to make up for war losses in shipping as well as for the decreases in neutral and world shipping. For the most part Japan had to rely upon her own power and ability for further shipbuilding.

To cope with this newly arisen situation, Japan enacted several important shipping acts including the Emergency Shipping Control Act, the Shipbuilding Industry Act, and the Shipbuilding Control Act. Of these laws, the most fundamental is the Shipbuilding Industry Act, whose nature and function it will be well to describe in detail. The law has been described by a semi-official Japanese source in this way:

(i) Purpose of the Law. "The purpose of the Law is to increase the supply of vessels at low costs and the maintenance of adequate shipbuilding capacity from the viewpoint of national defense. The Law as passed by the 74th session of the Diet in 1939 provides measures for Government protection and control of the shipbuilding industry."

(ii) Government Supervision. "By this Law, the shipbuilding industry is brought under strict Government supervision. The establishment of new enterprises, amalgamation, and cessation of work of shipbuilding companies are subject to permission from the Government."

(iii) Shipbuilders' Privileges. "Shipbuilders, however, are given the right of eminent domain and are allowed to issue debentures to an amount twice their paid-up capital. The Government may issue instructions as regards the building of hulls, engines, and equipment not yet made in this country, and may grant subsidies in such cases. It may also order shipbuilders to use domestic products in building hulls, engines, and equipment. The Government may set standards for quality and may disqualify products which do not conform to this standard."

<sup>1/</sup> Passed by the 74th session of the Diet in 1939.

(iv) Government Subsidy and Indemnity. "The Government may, if necessary for the promotion of the shipbuilding industry, grant subsidies to shipbuilders or shipowners. The Government may, in the public interest, order shipbuilders to effect changes in prices for vessels, hulls, engines, and equipment, as well as in repair costs, etc. The Government may also, when deemed necessary in the public interest, demand the installation, enlargement, and improvement of equipment, the repair of vessels, hulls, engines, and equipment, and the establishment of facilities for research on specified subjects. The Government may indemnify shipbuilders for any losses incurred by shipbuilders in the execution of these orders.

(v) The Right to Organize Compulsory Cartels. "The Law also contains provision for cooperative associations which may be organized by shipbuilders for collective purchasing, administration of materials, establishment of facilities for common use, control of business activities of members, and research work for the common benefit. The Government may order members of these associations to comply with regulations and may instruct outsiders to join the organizations. Finally, the Government may instruct such organizations to undertake certain activities for the healthful development of the industry."

b. Fundamental Shipbuilding Regulations. While thus strengthening the control over shipping and shipbuilding on the one hand, Japan adopted six measures in 1939 describing the standard for cargo vessels in order to encourage construction of these vessels on the other. Out of this a new national shipping policy grew up, under which a number of plans were put into execution.

But as an aftermath of 7 December 1941 a demand for more rapid increase in Japan's shipbuilding arose. To meet the situation, a set of fundamental systematic shipbuilding regulations were adopted and made public in May 1942. These regulations were drawn up on the assumption that shipbuilders were to build, according to government plan and with powerful government assistance, as many ships within a certain period of time as the demand warranted. For the realization of this program, the following technical qualifications were considered essential:



(i) For a determined standard-size ship, certain fixed specifications of the ship's hull, engine equipment, and other parts were to be furnished to the builder along with the necessary drawings. The idea was to help facilitate mass production of ships. It was, in short, to standardize the planning, so that complications would no longer arise as they had in the past when different shipbuilders presented individual ideas, plans, and drawings.

(ii) With regard to the order for a non-standard ship, construction work would not be accepted generally, except in such a special case as the building of a passenger boat.

(iii) In order to obtain the highest degree of efficiency from every individual shipyard, each yard would be assigned the building of a certain class of ship under the standardization plan, and would make the construction of such a type its speciality. There were nineteen classes, all told, running as follows: six classes or grades for cargo vessels, three for oil tankers, one for ore-carrying ships, five for wooden vessels, and four for wooden barges. The classes were divided as follows:

Freighters:

Type A	Total tonnage	6,300 tons
Type B	Total tonnage	4,400 tons
Type C	Total tonnage	2,700 tons
Type D	Total tonnage	1,900 tons
Type E	Total tonnage	830 tons
Type F	Total tonnage	495 tons

Tankers: Total tonnage of 10,000 tons, 5,000 tons and 1,000 tons.

Mineral ore freighters: Total tonnage of 5,500 tons.

The above vessels are made of steel. Vessels of smaller types, due to the lack of steel, are made of wood. They are called standard war-time wooden ships. They may be divided into two kinds:

Wooden freighters: Total tonnage of 250 tons, 200 tons, 150 tons, 100 tons and 70 tons.

Light wooden ships: Loaded tonnage of 300 tons, 200 tons, 150 tons and 100 tons.

### c. Other Rationalization Techniques

Aside from the point that individual builders were to come under the standardized shipbuilding scheme, the following points were also stressed:

(i) Standardized specification for steel used in shipbuilding, (ii) development to the utmost of the scope within which substitute materials are used, (iii) simplification of the ship's hull, engine, and equipment, (iv) expansion of the scope within which electric welding is applied, and (v) general saving of materials by improving shipbuilding technique.

### 3. Administration

a. The Navy Ministry (Kaigun-sho). On 5 February 1942, the Government promulgated the Imperial Ordinance relating to the special wartime case of jurisdiction with regard to the business of shipbuilding. This (a) limited the authority of the shipbuilding industry to regulate the supply and demand of important materials used for ships (i.e., set up a priority system); and (b) transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy, for the duration of the war only, jurisdiction (hitherto in the hands of the Minister of Communications (Tsushin-sho)) over construction and repair of merchant vessels.

Besides insuring elasticity between materials for naval construction and materials for merchant ship construction, this change made a single system out of the two construction plans, and in general contrived to regulate both. This put the construction of naval and merchant vessels fundamentally on the same footing. For it was desirable that the question of the relative percentage of naval and merchant craft to be constructed should be governed by a unified plan, in accordance with the availability of materials, building facilities, and current requirement.

Only general schedules, however, were to be set by the Navy Ministry, while the allocation of orders and raw materials for specific yards were to be handled by the Industrial Equipment Management Corporation on the one hand, and by the Shipbuilding Control Association (Zosen Tosaikai), on the other.

b. Industrial Equipment Management Corporation. Under the system of standard production and unified design which we have already described, ordering of ships by a single authority was inescapable, and the machinery that was set up to play the part of the single ordering authority was the Industrial Equipment Management Corporation. This National Policy Company took over the wartime standard-pattern ship program, on the basis of the government ship construction plans, and gave contracts to all the shipyards.

Aside from these activities, the corporation became the main instrument for financing Japanese shipbuilders and guaranteeing them against loss. In effect, it was at the same time a device for subsidizing the industry and for providing it with compensation in the case of loss, all at public expense.

According to the charter of this corporation, the necessary number of ships are to be assured as long as the country needs them. This the Government accomplishes, on the one hand, by making part of the cost of building new ships a direct national burden, and, on the other hand, by supplying floating capital for shipbuilding. By revising the ordinance concerning compensation of losses, the Government raised the limit of the floating capital it would supply from two-thirds to four-fifths of the capital value of any one shipyard. By lowering the sphere of application of these provisions it extends them to all ships classified as small wartime standard-pattern ships. It has also equalized compensation for loss of capital through its monetary organ, the Industrial Bank of Japan. (In connection with shipbuilding finances it is interesting to note that the Bank of Japan allegedly supplied ¥ 192,000,000 in 1942, in addition to the capital coming from other government agencies).

In the event that there ceases to be a national need for the finished ships and the corporation shall have occasion to sell them for private use, it has been decided that the Government shall pay compensation for losses incurred by the corporation and that the standard prices for constructing ships and for transferring them shall be decided by the Government.

The foregoing practices, besides establishing a financial policy, made the IEMC responsible for the positive expansion of shipbuilding through the application of two pivotal principles, namely, simplification of pattern and unitary construction -- one yard, one type. (See Appendix IVe for additional details).

c. Shipbuilding Control Society. The Shipbuilding Control Society is the central body directing the control associations in this industry. (To the Society is appended a consultative association which includes the related industrial control associations). The Shipbuilding Control Society assists in handling the supply of materials under a priority system. Affiliated with the central Shipbuilding Control Society are five regional shipbuilding consultative associations made up of the medium and small scale manufacturers. The president of the society, which was established in 1942, is SHIBA Koshiro (formerly head of Mitsubishi Jukogyo), and the Managing Director is Vice Admiral (Reserve) KUMAHARA Shigeharu.

According to a semi-official Japanese source, the Shipbuilding Control Society has been described as one of the planning agencies for general advancement of national power which has been established in Tokyo in accordance with the Major Industries Association Ordinance of September 1941. Member organizations of this society are designated by the Navy Ministry (formerly by the Ministry of Communications) on the basis of the following requirements:

- (i) Any shipbuilding association which builds ships over 100 meters long or constructs engines for ships, or both, may be admitted as a member organization.
- (ii) Any shipbuilding proprietor who cannot meet the foregoing requirements is not to be admitted.
- (iii) Any proprietor who manufactures or repairs parts for ships of the required length as mentioned above may become a member.
- (iv) Exceptions to the above regulations may be made upon the approval of the Navy Ministry (formerly upon approval of Communications Ministry).





The principal aim of the control society is to construct and repair ships within the framework of national planning of the Japanese Government. In order to carry this program into effect the society has also to secure the necessary raw materials and apply expert technique. The leading personnel members of the Shipbuilding Control Society include the President of the Society, the Chairmen of the Board of Directors, several Directors, several Supervisors, and several Advisers. The President of the Society is appointed by the Navy Minister (formerly by the Communications Minister). The Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors are appointed by the President of the Society, but with the approval of the same Minister, who, as he sees fit, may order the dissolution of the Shipbuilding Control Society. The Society holds an annual meeting at its General Headquarters within two months following the end of each year. Provisional meetings may be called upon the suggestion of the President.

Each member organization is required to make reports to General Headquarters concerning its construction progress, the condition of ships which it is repairing, the nature of the furnishings of its ships, establishment of new branches or various changes, relating to the ships themselves, labor, capital, and planning. (See Appendix IVF for a list of members of the Shipbuilding Control Society).

d. Local Associations (Kumiai) in Wooden Shipbuilding. At the outbreak of war, Japan's wooden shipbuilding industry consisted of over 3,000 yards, most of them employing less than ten workers and building small vessels by traditional handicraft methods. To unify and expand them to an industry capable of building a cargo fleet of significant dimensions has meant a drastic reorganization of the industry.

The first step was the forced consolidation of these yards under centralized government control. The 3,000 yards were reduced by merger to 600 and these in turn organized into 41 local associations, or Kumiai (in all urban and rural prefectures). These wooden shipbuilding associations were further organized into one unit, the Japanese Federation of Wooden Shipbuilding Associations.

Quotas of wooden vessels designed according to standard specifications were then allotted to each firm by the Japanese Federation of Wooden Shipbuilding Associations (later merged in or affiliated with the Shipbuilding Control Society under the "New Economic Structure"), under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications (later probably under the Navy Ministry.) The Navy, which controls steel ship construction, was given supervisory power over the building of vessels under fifty meters, as well as the control over the supply of engines and fittings. Quotas of materials, machinery, tools, etc., were allocated under the national economic mobilization plans. Low-cost financing and bonuses for production afforded financial incentives.

Excerpts, pages IV-239; IV-252 - IV-257; IV-259 - IV-269.

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船舶口側文書八八〇

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調査及び文析第二五五八。四

日本ノ軍需産業

第四部

造船事業

記事

日本ノ造船事業ノ前記、日米関係増進及び政府機関ノ  
歴史ヲ主トシテ取扱フ。亦該工業ノ能力及ビ工學的  
部面ヲモ論ズ。

一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ十月三十一日

米。。。。米。。。。米

一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノノ中頃迄ニ日本ノ商船及  
ビ海軍船舶ノ損害ノ々々航洋船舶費ガ没失シタノテ  
日本ハ各地ニ置カレタ軍隊ノ補給及ビ一九四三年ノ  
昭和十八年ノノ工業生産ノ水準ヲ維持スルニ必要ナ  
原材料ノ運搬ニ必要ナ輸送ノ途ツ失ツタ。此ノ損失  
ヲ埋合セルタメニハ一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノニ於  
テ少クモ二百五十万トンノ割テ商船ヲ建造シナ  
ケレバナラヌコトナツタ。

日本ノ管自報告（一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ九月  
五日）ニ依ツテ明カニサレタ最近ノ状況ハ日本ガ終

W. J. Van 886

戦時ニ於イテ類スル可動商船トシテ算（一〇〇）ト  
以上ノ入船及出船ニ三十万トシテ余シタテカツタコトナリ  
トナレル。

戦時中ノ軍艦建造及ト損失ニ因スル艦會ノ増大  
第十段ニアル。

此ノ数年ノ適合軍ノ同情及ト日本ノ軍實増大  
ノ取方ヲ得ンガタメニ少シク艦目ニ面シテアル  
モ知レナイ、何ハ其ノ總計ノ中ニハ可動トシテ算  
上トシテ算中ノ造船ノトシテ算ハ合ハレタナリ。

五ノ造船事業ノ進展

一 艦隊ノ進展及ト其ノ時期

一九三三年ノ昭和七年ノ艦隊ノ進展

日本ノ造船事業ノ安定性ト其後進トニ就イテ  
ノ假令ノ問題ノ考案ニ面シテ、如何ナル程度  
迄該工業が經濟的ナラズル能ハレテ其後進  
タカク決定スル目的ヲ以テ我々が眞實圖ニ足  
ク簡單ニ日本ニ於ケル造船事業ノ經濟的方面  
ヲ觀察スルニトガ必要ナリ。

一八六八年ノ明治元年ノ維新以來、日本  
政府ハ造船ノ問題ニ細心ノ注意ヲ拂ヒ一八九  
五年ノ明治二十八年ノ中日ニ於ケル戦役ノ  
直後政府ハ一八九六年ノ明治二十九年ノ  
決定スル造船ニ則テ其後進ノ計畫ニ着手シ  
タ。

Aug Dec 880

第一次世界大戦當時、（一九一四年、大正  
八年）、六二万二千トンノ商船が建造シ、  
大戦中ノ長崎ナ好景氣ノ状態ハ獎勵金ノ増  
長ヲ減ジ、然シノ後復セテ増進シ、  
獎勵金ノ年額ハ一九一五年、大正四年、暴落  
ニモドル傾向ヲ示シ。

一九二〇年代ノ間、造船工業ハ憂慮ノ不況  
入リ、一九二七年、昭和二年、ニ於テ、商  
船建造ハ四万二千トンノ僅キニ縮減シ、  
シテ運用サレ、助成金ハ年額一千万圓ニ  
減シ。此ノ間政府ハ更張造船助成金ヲ改  
修シ、内、四内ノ借債生産ニ對スル  
助成金及ビ其ノ還ノ輸入税ノ免除ニヨリテ造船  
業者ヲ補助シ。一九二九年、昭和四年、政  
府ハ造船ノ為ニ、容易ナ條件ノ貸付金ノ修  
テ造船ノ助成計畫ヲ立案シ、三千万圓ノ貸付  
金ガ運用サレ得ルコトニナリ。然シツイ  
テ通ツル世界即ニ不況ニヨリコノ不安ニサ  
シテ彼ニ立ッテマツ。ソレヲ緩慢ニ増加  
ガベジマツ。増加ノ割合ハ一九三〇年代ノ  
初期ニ於テ政府ノ商船建造助成計畫ニヨリテ  
大イニ促進サレ。政府ノ指導ノ下ニ日本ノ  
流亡ハ、世界ニ於ケルノ最ノ如何ナルモノ  
ニモ運送ニ於テ建造奨励船ヲ増強シ、テアル



Ref Doc 880

船舶及造船計費、一九三〇年代ニ於ケル造船

一九三二年ノ昭和七年ノ日本政府ハ重大ナル決定ヲシタ、即チ日本ノ商船隊ノ不利ヲ船舶分布ヲ改善シ、且ツ船舶事業ノ利益ヲ以テ少スルメニ、政府ハ「船舶及造船」三計費中ノ第一ノモノヲ決定シタ。一九三二年ノ昭和七年ノ「大日本商船隊」見込第一計費ハ、増加並ニ船隻ヲ建造サレル新船毎トシニツキ船齡二十五年又ハソレ以上ノ船舶ノ二トシヲ屠殺トスルトイフ條件ノ下ニ、二十萬總トンノ新船建造ヘノ途ヲ開イタ。新船ハ各々四千總トン又ハソレ以上デ、少クトモ十三ノット半以上ノ速ヲ出シ得、且ツ日本ノ造船所ヲ作ラレルモノヲ要シタ。

コノ計費ハ、約四十萬總トン、九十四隻ノ船舶ヲスクラップ化シ、約二十萬總トンノ三十一隻ノ新船ノ建造ヲ見ルト云フ結果ヲ生シタ。

三十一隻ノ船舶ヲ建造スルニ要シタ經費ハ五千五百万圓弱ト見積ラレタ。政府ノ助成金ノ總額ハ一千一百萬圓近クデアッタ。

ソレゾレ一九三五年ノ昭和十年ノ一九三六年ノ昭和十一年ノニ制定サレタ第二、第三ノ

Ref Doc 880

計費ハ第一ノヨリハ小規模ノモノデアツタ。  
二者ヲ結合シタ結果ハ、十萬總トンノスクラ  
ップ化、約十萬總トン、十七隻ノ船舶ノ建造  
トナリ、助成金ノ割合ハ、第一計費ノ際ノ半  
分強デアツタ。建造サレタ船舶ハ四千トン或  
ハソレ以上ノ總トン數ヲ有シ、且十五ノット  
以上ノ速力ヲ出スコトガ出来タ。

(以下次頁)

[illegible]

船三良以  
海計三良  
一三良以  
二三良以

四  
五  
六  
七  
八

凡他ノ國ニ出ルモノハ

[illegible]

4

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PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fc2572/>

108 Dec 880

第十八表

通水商船ノ總計（噸位）

年次	隻數	噸位
一九二三	一五二	六四、六六〇
一九二〇	一四〇	四五六、六四二
一九三〇	三七	一五二、二七二
一九三二	四四	三四、四二二
一九三四	一五五	一五二、四二〇
一九三六	一八〇	一九四、八六一
一九三七	一八〇	四五一、二二二
一九三八	一四六	四四二、七二〇

出典、自云ノ造船一九四〇年（日本經濟年鑑）

一九三〇年代中期ノ造船ハ造船業ノ振興期ニ入リ  
 造船ニ附ツテ居タ、然シ中トノハ争動を促進シタ  
 造船業ハ増加ニ對スル要求ガ起存テ造船カラ造船業  
 易居ノ中小型船ニ傾キシタコトヲ認識スルシタ。一  
 九三九年五月末迄ニ發セラレタ注文總額中一六五萬  
 ノ噸位ノ總噸數ハ八〇八、六七〇噸デアッタ。其  
 等ノ中七、〇〇〇噸以上ノ造船三四隻ノ總噸數ハ



Ref Doc 880

三〇六、六〇〇噸デ六、〇〇〇噸以下ノモノ一三三  
隻ノ總噸數ハ五〇二、〇七〇噸デアツタ。一九三八  
年十一月三十日、即チ六ヶ月以前ノ數字ニ比較シテ  
前者級ノ船ハ隻數ニ於テ二、噸數ニ於テ二七、九三  
〇噸ノ減少ヲ示シタ。然シ後者級ノ船ハ隻數ニ於テ  
八五、噸數ニ於テ三二五、四二〇噸ノ増加ヲ示シタ。  
第十九表ハ一九三二年ヨリ一九三八年ニ至ル間ノ一  
〇〇〇噸級ノ進水船ヲ示ス。此處ニハ特別ナ變化ハ  
殆ド見ラレナイ

(五 頁)

第十九表 (次頁)

9

Ref Doc 880

噸數別	一九三二	一九三三	一九三六	一九三七	一九三八
噸數別	噸數	噸數	噸數	噸數	噸數
1000	1500	1800	2880	3635	2929
1000	2900	3300	1205	3500	3285
1000	3500	3000	3150	2800	2200
1000	900	900	2890	6200	4220
1000	20	25	2500	3380	1595
1000	1200	2210	3200	5858	10475
1000	1	9	2215	9342	3550
1000	1680	1755	1755	8900	9800
1000	1	2	1822	9000	1500
1000	1	1	3880	5510	1220
總計	10760	20124	27071	93419	77140

Ref Doc 880

○、海軍建造。商船建造トノ比較

海軍艦船建造ハ次表（第二十表）ニ示サレル如ク、  
此ノ期間ニ勿論又力ヲ入レラレタ。商船ノ進水モ亦  
此表ニ載セテアル。其等ノ數字ト表ニ附十九表ニ示  
シタ數字トノ間ニ少シ違ツタ所ガアルコトニ氣ガ付  
クコトト思フ。斯ノ如キ差異ハ大シタ意味アルワケ  
デナク、主トシテ異ル出典ノ資料ニ依ツタコトヲ反  
映シテ居ル。下ニ記載スルモノハ一九四〇年マデノ  
モノデアル

第二十表

日本並ニ日本ノ統制下ニアル領土内ノ造船所デ  
進水セル銅鐵商船及ビ海軍艦船ノ總噸數

一九三四——一九四〇

	海軍艦船 (噸數ニ表ハス)	商船 (英噸)
一九四〇	一五七、五二〇	二〇八、〇一四
一九三九	一六八、七九〇	三四二、八八〇
一九三八	五三、八二二	四三八、八九〇
一九三七	五二、二五八	四八七、三五七

Ref Doc 880

一九三六	五三、三〇五	三〇五、八〇三
一九三五	三九、七六二	一四五、九〇一 註参照
一九三四	三八、二七四	一五四、八六〇 註参照

出典 グラスゴウヘラルド、貿易年鑑、一九三六年一九三七年一九三八年號

ロイド船籍簿、ロンドン、一九四三年三月ニ受ケタル資料ニ依リ特ニ表ニ作り上テタモノ

ジエーン、軍艦、一九四一年刊、オリエンタル、エコノミスト、(東京) 一九三六年四月號

註、日本々土ノ建造高ノミヲ含ム。

## 二、政府ノ奨励及管理諸法律

「造船事業法」造船事業法、中國及歐州戦争ハ日本ノ軍用船舶ノ大規模ナ増強ヲ必要トシタ。船舶ノ戦争ニ依ル損失ハ中立國船舶及世界船舶ノ減少ト共ニ之ヲ補填スルコトガ必要デアツタ。日本ハ以後ノ造船ニ就イテハ大部分自國ノ能力ニ依存セネバナラナカツタ。

コノ新タニ生起シタ情勢ニ對展スルタメ、日本ハ臨時船舶管理法、造船事業法並ニ造船統制法ヲ初メ徴種ノ重要ナ船舶關係法律ヲ制定シタ。之等法律ノ内、最も重要ナノハ造船事業法デソノ性質並ニ機能

Ref Doc 880

ヲ詳述スルコトハ當ヲ得タモノト思フ。本法ハ日本ノ半官邊筋ガ次ノ様ニ説明シテギル。

1. 一九三九年第七十四議會通過

(1) 本法ノ目的 「本法ノ目的トスル所ハ國防上ノ見地カラ低價格ニヨル船舶供給ヲ増大シ、十分ナル造船能力ノ維持ヲナスニアル。一九三九年第七十四議會ヲ通過シタ本法ハ造船事業ノ以府ニヨル保護、統制ノ措置ヲ規定シテイル。」

(2) 政府管理 「本法ニ據リ造船事業ハ嚴重ナル政府ノ管理下ニ置カレル。新規企業ノ設立、合併及造船會社ノ事業ノ中止ハ政府ノ許可ヲ受クベキコトトナル。」

(3) 造船業者ノ特權 「合併造船業者ハ土地收容權ヲ與ヘラレ又拂込株金ノ二倍額迄ノ社債ヲ發行スルコトヲ許サレル。政府ハ未ダ此旨ニ於テ製造サレタコトノナイ船體、機件、及び機件品ノ製作ニ關シ指示ヲ發シ得、且ソノ場合獎勵金ヲ交附シ得ル。政府ハ又造船業者ニ船體、機件及機件品ノ製作ニ當リ品質ノ使用ヲ命ズルコトガ出來ル。政府ハ性能ノ規格ヲ定メコノ規格ニ適合シナイ製品ヲ不合格トスルコトガ出來ル。」

(4) 政府助成金及損失補償金 「造船事業振興上必

Ref Doc 980

要ナ場合、政府ハ造船業者或ハ船舶所有者ニ助成金ヲ交附シ得ル。政府ハ公共ノ利益ノ爲造船業者ニ船舶、船体、機関及機製品ノ價格並ニ修繕料等ノ變更ヲ命ズルコトガ出來ル。政府ハ又公益上必要アリト認ムルトキハ設備ノ新設、増設又ハ改良、船舶、船体、機関及機製品ノ修繕、並ニ特殊事項ノ研究施設ノ設立ヲ要求スルコトガ出來ル。政府ハ造船事業ガ之等命令ノ實施ニ當リ蒙ル損失ニ對シ補償金ヲ支拂フコトガ出來ル。」

(5) 強制的企業組合ヲ組織スル福利 「本法ハ又共同購入、資材ノ管理、共同ノ使用ニ供スル施設ノ設立、組合員ノ事業活動ノ統制及共通ノ利益ノ爲ノ研究事業ヲ目的トシ造船業者ガ共同組合ヲ組織シ得ル如キ條項ヲ含ンデキル。政府ハ是等組合員ニ規定ニ從フコトヲ命ジ且組合外業者ヲ組合ニ加入セシメルコトガ出來ル。最後ニ政府ハ本事業ノ健全ナル發達ノ爲該組合組織ニ對シ何等カノ事業ヲ行フベキコトヲ命ジ得ル。」

基本的造船法規、斯ク一方ニ船舶、及び造船ニ關シ統制ヲ強化スルト共ニ他面日本ハ一九三九年貨物船建造ヲ奨励スル爲貨物船ノ規格ヲ示ス六ツノ標準ヲ採用シタ。之ニヨリ新タナ國家的船舶政策ガ起



Ref Doc 880

リ、ソレニ從ツテ多數ノ企劃ガ實行ニ移サレタ。  
年併一九四一年十二月七日ノ余波トシテ日本ノ造船ノ一層急速ナル増強ノ要求ガ起ツタ。コノ情勢ニ對應スル爲、一連ノ基本的、組織的造船法規ガ採用サレ一九四二年五月公布サレタ。是等法規ハ、造船業者ガ政府ノ企劃ニ從ヒ、政府ノ強力ナル援助ヲ受ケテ一定ノ期間内ニ、要求ガ容認スルダケノ量ノ船舶ヲ建造セネバナラタトイフ假定ノ下ニ作成サレタ。本計畫實現ノ爲次ノ如キ技術的條件ガ肝要ト考ヘラレタ。

(i) 決定シタ標準型船舶建造ノ爲、船體、機艙裝備及其他部分ノ一定ノ仕様書ヲ必要ナ圖面ト共ニ造船業者ニ供給スルコトデアツタ。ソノ目的ハ船舶ノ大量生産ヲ容易ナラシムルコトニアツタ。之ハ要スルニ過去ニ於テ異ナツタ造船業者ガ個々ノ考案、企劃及圖面ヲ呈出スル場合ニ生ジタ様ナ困難ヲ來サシメヌ爲、企劃ヲ標準化スルコトデアツタ。

(ii) 非標準型船ノ注文ニ關シテハ客船建造ノ如キ特殊ナル場合ヲ除キ一般ニ建造ハ引キ受ケヌコトトナツタ。

(iii) 各スベテノ造船所ニ最高ノ能率ヲ發揮サセル爲各造船所ハ標準化計畫中ノ一定ノ級ノ船舶建造ヲ指

Ref Doc 880

定サレ、ソノ型ノ建造ヲ専門トスルコトニナツタ。  
 全部テ十九級アツテ次ノ通りデアル。即チ貨物船ハ  
 六階級、油槽船ハ三階級、鑽石輸送船ハ一階級、木  
 造船ハ五階級、木造船船ハ四階級デアル。是等ノ級  
 ハ次ノ如ク列シタル。

貨物船

A 型	總 電 数	六、三〇〇 屯
F 型	總 電 数	四、四〇〇 屯
C 型	總 電 数	二、七〇〇 屯
D 型	總 電 数	一、九〇〇 屯
E 型	總 電 数	八三〇 屯
F 型	總 電 数	四九五 屯

油槽船、總電数、一〇、〇〇〇屯、五、〇〇〇屯、一、〇〇〇屯

鑽石輸送船、總電数、五、五〇〇屯

上記船舶ハ鋼造船デアル。之ヨリ小型ノ船ハ鋼製  
 不足ノ爲木造デアル。是ハ戰時標準型木造船ト稱サ  
 レテル。是ハ二種類ニ區分シ得ル。

木造食物船 總電数二五〇屯、二〇〇屯、一五〇  
 屯、一〇〇屯、七〇屯

輕量木造船 總電数、三〇〇屯、二〇〇屯、一  
 五〇屯、一〇〇屯

16

Ref Doc 880

### ○ 其他ノ合理化措置

各造船業者ガ標準造船計畫ニ從ツテ行フ外ニ、  
次ノ諸點ガ強調サレヌ。

(i) 造船用鋼材ニ關スル標準規格、(ii) 代用資材ノ  
使用範圍ヲ極度ニ擴張スルコト、(iii) 船体機件及ビ  
裝備品ヲ簡單化スルコト、(iv) 電気銲接使用範圍ヲ  
擴張スルコト、(v) 造船術ヲ改善シ以テ全般ニ亘リ資  
材ヲ節約スルコト

### 三、監理

A、海軍省一九四二年二月五日政府ハ造船業ニ關  
スル權限ノ戰時特別取扱ニ對スル勅令ヲ發布シ  
タ、コレハ造船用重要資材ノ需要供給ヲ調整ス  
ル爲メ造船業ノ權限ヲ制限シ（即チ優先權ヲ設定  
シ又(B)戰時ニ限り商船ノ建造及ビ修理ニ關スル  
（從來通信省ノ掌握シテキタ）權限ヲ海軍省ノ  
權限ニ委譲スルコトデアツタ。

コノ變更ハ建造資材ト商船建造用資材トノ間ニ  
彈力性ヲ有タセタ外ニ二ツノ建造計畫ヲ單一系ト  
ナシ且ツ全般的ニ兩者ヲ調整シヨウト企テタモノ

Ref Doc 880

デア、ソノタメニ軍艦及ビ商船ノ建造ハ根本  
的ニ同一基礎ノ上ニ置カレルコトニナツタ但シ  
建造スベキ軍艦及ビ商船ノ比率ノ問題ハ資材ノ  
有無、建造費輸入と海面ノ要求ト睨ミ合セテ、  
一元的企业ニヨツテ統制サレルコトガ望マシイ  
カラデアツタ。

然シ海軍省ノ決定スルノハ一般計數ダケデア  
ツテ、何ノ造船ニ發註シ且ツ資材ヲ制営テルカ  
ハ、一方ニ於テ産業設備營團又地方ニ於テ造船  
統制會ノ掌ル所デアツタ。

B 産業設備營團上述ノ如ク標準生産及ビ一元  
化設計ノ組織ニ於テハ、單一權威者ヨリ建造命  
令ヲ發スルコトハ止ムシ得ナイコトデアリ、而  
シテコノ單一發註權威者ノ役ヲ行使スルタメニ  
設定サレタ機關ハ産業設備營團デアツタ、コノ  
團策會社ハ政府ノ造船計畫ニ基ク戰時規格船建  
造業ヲ購買シ、各造船所ト契約ヲ行ツタ。

コレ等ノ仕事ノ外ニ該營團ハ日本ノ造船業者  
ニ對スル金融及ビ損失補償ノ主タル機關トナツ  
タ、石ハ事實上該産業ヲ補助スルト共ニ損失ノ

18

Ref Doc 880

場合ニハ凡テ政府ノ負擔ニ於テ補償ヲ行フ機  
テアツタ。

コノ營國ノ規定ニ依レバ國家ガ船舶ヲ必要ト  
スル限リ其所要額ヲ引受クベキコトニナツテキ  
ル政府ハ一方ニ於テ新船建造費ノ一部ヲ直接國  
庫負擔トナシ又他方ニ於テ建造用流動資金ヲ供  
給スルコトニ依リ、コレヲ達成セントスルノテ  
アル。政府ハ損失補償ニ關スル勅令ヲ改正シ、  
供給シ得ル流動資金ノ限度ヲ各造船所ノ資本金  
ノ三分ノ二ヨリ五分ノ四ニ引上ゲタコレ等ノ規  
定ノ適用範圍ヲ引下ゲ、政府ハ小型臨時規格船  
トシテ分類サレテキル凡ノ船舶ニモコレヲ適用  
シタ、又資本ノ損失ニ對シテハソノ金融機關タ  
ル日本興業銀行ヲ通シ補償ヲ均分シタ、(建造  
資金ノ金融ニ關連シ他ノ政府代理者ニヨリ融通  
サレタル資金ノ外ニ一九四二年中日本銀行ガ融  
資シタト云ハル、金額ガ一億九千二百万圓ニ上  
ツタコトハ興味アル點デアル。)

竣工セル船舶ニ對シテ國家ガ不用トナリ而シテ  
營國ガ民間用トシテ拂下ゲル場合ニハ、營國ノ  
蒙リタル損失ニ對シテハ政府ガ補償ヲ行ヒ而シ

Def Doc 880

テ標準建造價格及ビ拂下ゲ價格ハ政府ガコレヲ決定スルヤウニ取極メテアツタ。

融資方針ヲ確立スル一方上述ノ措置ニ依リ、造船ハ、二ツノ基本原則、即チ船型ノ簡素化及ビ一造船型主義ノ採用ヲ通ジ造船費ノ積率的擴大ニ對スル責任ヲ負荷スルコト、ナツタ、(尙詳編ハ附録第四B参照)

○造船統制會、造船統制會ハコノ工業ニ於ケル造船統制會ヲ指導スル中央機關デアル(コノ會ニハ附屬トシテ關係産業統制會ヲ包含スル諮問協會ガ存在スル)造船統制會ハ重點主義ニ則リ資材ヲ供給スル事務ヲ援助スル、中央ノ造船統制會ニ加盟シ居ルモノニ中小業者ヨリ組織サレタ。地域別造船諮問會ガ五ツ存在スル、コノ統制會ハ一九四二年ニ設立セラレ、會長ハ斯波孝四郎(前三重工業會長)常務理事ハ(豫備役)海軍中將桑原重治デアル。

日本側ノ半官消息通ノ傳フル所ニ依レバ造船統制會ハ、一九四一年九月發布ノ重要産業團體令ニ從ツテ東京ニ設立サレタ國力増進ニ對スル企業機關ノ一ツデアルトイフコノ會ノ會員ハ次ノ條件ニ基イテ海軍省(以前ニハ通信省)ニ依リ指名サレタ。



Def Doc 880

- (1) 長サ一〇〇米以上ノ船ヲ建造シ又ハ船用機器ヲ建造シ又ハ兩者ヲ建造スル造船會社ハ會員トシテ入會シ得ルコト。
- (2) 上記ノ要件ヲ具ヘナイ造船事業主ハ入會ヲ許サレナイ
- (3) 前項規定ノ長サノ船舶ニ對スル部分品ヲ製造又ハ修理スル事業主ハ會員トシテ入會スルコトガ出來ル
- (4) 上記規定ニ對スル例外ハ海軍省（以前ニハ通信省）ノ許可ヲ得テ作ルコトガ出來ル。

統制會ノ主ナル目的ハ日本政府ノ國家計畫ノ枠内ニテ船舶ヲ建造修理スルコトニアル。此ノ計畫ヲ實施スルタメニ統制會ハ又必要ナル原材料ヲ確保シ且ツ熟練技術ヲ充用スルノ要ガアル造船統制會ノ重要職員ニハ會長、理事長、若干ノ理事、若干ノ監事及ビ若干ノ顧問ガアル。會長ハ海軍大臣（従前ハ遞信大臣）ガ之ヲ任命スル。理事長及ビ各會長ガ之ヲ任命スルガ、ソノ際同大臣ノ承認ヲ必要トスル。同大臣ハ適當ト

Ref Doc 880

認メル時ハ造船統制會ノ解散ヲ命ズルコトガ出  
來ルノデアル。統制會ハ毎年度終了後二ヶ月以  
内ニソノ親本部ニ於テ年次會合ヲ開催スル。臨  
時會合ハ會長ノ提議ニヨリ招集シ得ル。會員タ  
ル各組織體ハ、建造ノ進捗度修理中ノ船舶ノ情  
況ソノ船舶ノ裝備ノ性質支所ノ新設或ハ其ノ他  
船舶ソノモノ、労働、資本、計費等ニ關聯スル  
種々ナ變動ニ就キ、親本部ニ報告ヲ爲ス要ガア  
ル。(造船統制會會員名簿ニ就テハ附録ニ參照)

#### D 木造船建造ニ於ケル地方聯合體(組合)

戦争ノ勃發當時日本ノ木造船建造工業ハ三千  
以上ノ造船所ヨリ構成サレテ居リ其ノ大部分ハ  
雇傭勞務者十名以下ヲ福來ノ手工業的方法ニヨ  
リ小船舶ヲ建造シテ居ルモノデアツタ。之等ヲ  
統合擴張シテ有用ナ大サヲ有スル貨物船隊ヲ建  
造シ得ル工業タラシメルニハ此ノ工業ノ強力ナ  
再組織ヲ必要トシタ。

其ノ第一段階ハ政府ノ一元的統制ノ下ニ之等  
造船所ヲ強制的ニ統合スルコトデアツタ。三千  
ノ造船所ハ合同ニ依リ六百ニ減ジ、之亦四十一

Ref Doc 880

ノ地方聯合会即ち組合（總テノ都市區、農村縣ヲ通ジテ）ニ組織サレタ。之等木造船組合ハ更ニ單一ノ日本木造船組合聯合會ニ組織サレタ。

次デ日本木造船組合聯合會（後ニ、一經濟新體制」ノ下ニ造船統制會ニ合同又ハ参加シタ）ガ、逓信省（後ニハ逓信省）ノ直接ノ統制下ニ、各會社ニ標準仕様書ニ從ツテ設計サレタ木造船ノソノ擔當スベキ分ヲ割當テタ。鋼船建造ノ統制ニ當ル船隻ハ五十米以下ノ船舶ノ建造ニモ、機材機械部面ノ供給ト同様、之ニ對スル監督權ヲ與ヘラレテキタ。原材料、機械類工具類等ハ國家經濟動員計畫ノ下ニ專管ガ行ハレルコトニナツテキタ。低利ノ資金供給ト生産褒獎金トハ金融面ヨリ刺激ヲ與ヘタ。

按 率

IV 二三九、IV 二五二 I

IV 二五七 頁

IV 二五九 I IV 二六九 頁